PROBLEMS OF DETERMINING THE LEGAL PERSONALITY OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.66556/2522-4549.2024.melnychuk-nKeywords:
artificial intelligence, legal personality, electronic person, civil liability, autonomy, roboticsAbstract
The article examines the theoretical and legal problems of determining the legal personality of artificial intelligence systems in the context of modern civil and international law. The classical doctrine of legal personality based on the concept of conscious will is analyzed and its applicability to artificial intelligence systems capable of making autonomous decisions without direct human intervention is determined. The Resolution of the European Parliament of February 16, 2017, with recommendations to the Commission on civil law rules on robotics (2015/2103(INL)), in particular the provisions on creating a special legal status of an "electronic person" for autonomous robots, is examined, and the arguments of proponents and opponents of such an approach are identified. The provisions of the Civil Code of Ukraine of January 16, 2003, regarding the subjects of civil legal relations are analyzed and the possibility of adapting the institution of legal entity to the needs of legal regulation of artificial intelligence systems is examined. The problem of civil liability for damage caused by autonomous artificial intelligence systems is considered, in particular the issue of distribution of liability between the developer, owner and operator of the system. The issues of intellectual property rights to objects created by artificial intelligence systems are examined, in particular the precedent-setting DABUS case regarding the recognition of an AI system as the inventor of a patented invention, and the decisions of the United States Patent and Trademark Office and the European Patent Office on this matter. The inexpediency of recognizing artificial intelligence as a full-fledged legal entity at the current stage of technological development is substantiated, and alternative legal constructions are proposed, including the model of liability by analogy with liability for damage caused by a source of increased danger (Article 1187 of the Civil Code of Ukraine).References
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